Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in European Commission Merger Law by Reeves, Tony & Dodoo, Ninette
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 29, Issue 5 2005 Article 5
Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial
Review in European Commission Merger Law
Tony Reeves∗ Ninette Dodoo†
∗
†
Copyright c©2005 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial
Review in European Commission Merger Law
Tony Reeves and Ninette Dodoo
Abstract
This Article considers, in light of the judgment in Tetra Laval ECJ, what standard the Com-
mission’s decisions in the field of merger control must satisfy if they are to withstand judicial
scrutiny, and whether the Commission’s concerns that the standard has been raised are justified.
We also consider how the Courts’ review of Commission decisions has evolved, what the standard
of such judicial review now is, and what margin of appreciation is left to the Commission. Along
the way, some observations are made as to how the position could be clarified further so as to
ensure a satisfactory competition law regime that inspires confidence and promotes legal certainty.
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INTRODUCTION
The standard to which the European Commission (the
"Commission") must prove its case before finding an undertak-
ing to be in breach of the competition provisions of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"),' or before
prohibiting a merger under the European Commission Merger
Regulation ("EC Merger Regulation"),2 has been the subject of
intense debate and scrutiny among academics, practitioners, the
Judiciary, and the Commission in recent years. The recent
proliferation of appeals and annulments of Commission deci-
sions, particularly in the field of merger control, has intensified
the debate and highlighted the need for clarity regarding both
the standard the Commission must meet in order to prohibit a
merger, and the standard of review applied by the Courts in rela-
tion to the Commission's decisions.' The February 2005 Euro-
pean Court of Justice ("ECJ") judgment in Commission v. Tetra
Laval (" Tetra Laval ECJ')4 has further contributed to the debate
on both the standard of proof required of the Commission and
* Tony Reeves is a Partner at Clifford Chance LLP (Brussels). Ninette Dodoo is a
Senior Associate at Clifford Chance LLP (Brussels). The authors would like to thank
Dimos Dakanalis and Anna Morfey for their comments and assistance in the prepara-
tion of this Article. The Article reflects the personal views of the authors and is not to
be attributed to Clifford Chance LLP or its clients.
1. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
O.J. C 325/33 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
2. See generally Council Regulation No. 139/2004, arts. 14-15, OJ. L 24/1, at 15
(2004) (on the control of concentrations between undertakings) [hereinafter EC
Merger Regulation].
3. See, e.g., Airtours PLC v. Commission, Case T-342/99, [2002] E.C.R. II-2585,
2634, 120, [2002] 5 C.M.L.R. 317, 348; see also Schneider Electric SA v. Commission,
Case T-310/01, [2002] E.C.R. IH-4071, 4142, 236-38, [2003] 4 C.M.L.R. 17, 810;
Lagarder SCA & Canal+ v. Commission, Case T-251/00, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4825, 4878,
158, [2003] C.M.L.R. 20, 1000.
4. See Commission v. Tetra Laval, Case C-12/03 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-987, 75-78,
[2005] 4 C.M.L.R. 8, 649-50 [hereinafter Tetra Laval ECJ] affg Tetra Laval v. Commis-
sion, Case T-05/02, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4381, [2002] 5 C.M.L.R 28 [hereinafter Tetra Laval
CF].
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the intensity of review permissible by the Court of First Instance
("CFI," and together with the ECJ, the "Courts").
Since 2002, regarded by many to have been the Commis-
sion's annus horribilis, the Commission has complained openly
that the cumulative effect of recent CFI and ECJ judgments has
been to raise the standard of proof to such a degree that it would
now be very difficult, if not impossible, for the Commission to
prove that certain types of mergers are anticompetitive.5 These
concerns were clearly articulated in the Commission's appeal of
the CFI's decision in Tetra Laval v. Commission (Tetra Laval CF1) ,6
where the Commission accused the CFI of "purporting to apply
a standard of review based on manifest error of assessment while,
in reality, applying a different standard"7 and stated that "the
Court of First Instance, whilst referring to 'manifest error of as-
sessment' in the judgment, has in fact significantly raised the
level of standard of proof required from the Commission to pro-
hibit a conglomerate merger and has thereby gone beyond the
review of legality."8
It is important to place the Commission's seeming frustra-
tion at what it views as excessive judicial control in the context of
the European Community's ("EC") institutional balance in the
field of merger control. Under the EC administrative system of
merger control, the Commission not only enjoys wide investiga-
tive powers, akin to those of a public prosecutor, it also is the
sole arbiter, in the first instance, of whether a merger is anticom-
petitive or not, and has the power to enforce its decisions9 by
5. See Mario Siragusa, Lecture at the U.K. Competition Commmission's Biannual
Series: Judicial Review of Competition Decisions Under EC Law (Sept. 21, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our-role/cc_lectures/udi-
cialcontrol_210904_siragusa.pdf.
6. Tetra Laval CFI, Case T-05/02, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4381, [2002] 5 C.M.L.R 28.
7. Appeal brought on 13January 2003 by the Commission of the European Communities
against the judgment delivered on 25 October 2002 by the First Chamber of the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities in case T-5/02 between Tetra Laval BV and the Commis-
sion of the European Communities, O.J. C 70/3, at 4, 1 (2003) [hereinafter Tetra Laval
Appeal].
8. Id. at 4, 1.
9. See Christopher Bellamy, Address at the Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.
[OECD] Roundtable on Judicial Enforcement of Competition Law (Nov. 27, 1997),
reprinted in OECD, JUDIcIAL ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAw 105, OECD Doc.
OCDO/GD(97)200, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/41/1919985.pdf
(stating that, in this sense, the CFI is not, strictly speaking, "a court of first instance"-
the Commission is).
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imposing fines,'" other conditions, or ultimately, by prohibiting
the merger from taking place." On the one hand, the multi-
tude of duties which the Commission is called to fulfill 12 and the
clear intention of the EC legislature to identify the Commission
as the main driving force behind the shaping and application of
competition law,"3 make it imperative that the Commission
should enjoy a certain degree of discretion in the discharge of its
duties. On the other hand, it is precisely this multiplicity of roles
that necessitates the existence of an effective system of judicial
review. It is clear that the debate about the standard of proof
(and the standard of review) is part of a larger debate on due
process and the balance between maintaining, on the one hand,
a fast and effective system of merger control and, on the other
hand, rigorous examination of Commission decisions by EC
courts.' 4
This Article considers, in light of the judgment in Tetra La-
val ECJ, what standard the Commission's decisions in the field of
merger control must satisfy if they are to withstand judicial scru-
tiny, and whether the Commission's concerns that the standard
has been raised are justified. We also consider how the Courts'
review of Commission decisions has evolved, what the standard
of such judicial review now is, and what margin of appreciation is
10. See generally EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, arts. 14-15, O.J. L 24/1, at 15-
16 (2004) (authorizing the Commission to impose fines and periodic penalty payments
on undertakings engaging in anticompetitive mergers).
11. See id. art. 8, O.J. L 24/1, at 11 (2004).
12. Contrast these duties with the United States, where the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Department of Justice act as prosecutors only. See, e.g., Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Guide to the Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/
pubs/general/guidetoftc.htm#action (last visited Jan.24, 2006) (explaining how the di-
vision of enforcement acts to protect consumers); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Mission State-
ment and Statutory Authority, http://www.usdoj.gov/02organizations/index.html (last
visitedJan. 24, 2006) (discussing the role of Attorney General as prosecutor). It is then
for U.S. courts to decide whether a merger is anticompetitive or not, based on a full
review of the facts before them.
13. See Europa, Mission of Competition Directorate General, http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/mission (last visited Jan. 24, 2006) (explaining
that the role of the Competition Directorate General is to enforce the competition
rules of the European Community).
14. See, e.g., H.C.H. Hofmann, Good Governance in European Merger Control: Due Pro-
cess and Checks and Balances Under Review, 24 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 120, 120-22
(2003);John Swift Q.C., U.K. Competition Commission Autumn Lecture: Judicial Con-
trol of Competition Decisions in the U.K. and EU (Sept. 21, 2004), available at http://
www.competition-commission.org.uk/our-role/ccjlectures/judicial-control 210904
swift.pdf.
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left to the Commission. Along the way, some observations are
made as to how the position could be clarified further so as to
ensure a satisfactory competition law regime that inspires confi-
dence and promotes legal certainty.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN STANDARD OF PROOF AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a preliminary issue, it is important to distinguish between
standard of proof and standard of review. By standard of proof
we refer to the standard incumbent upon the Commission-as
the administrative body deciding cases at first instance-in con-
cluding that conduct infringes the EC Treaty's competition pro-
visions (i.e., Articles 81 or 82) or in prohibiting a merger under
the EC Merger Regulation.15 The standard of review, on the
other hand, refers to the intensity with which the Court will re-
view a Commission decision that is brought before it on ap-
peal.16 In competition cases, this involves an appeal to the Court
of First Instance ("CFI"), and subsequently an appeal, on points
of law only, to the European Court of Justice ("ECJ").17 While
theoretically the concepts of standard of proof and standard of
review are distinct-the former pertaining to the Commission
and the latter to the Courts-in practice they draw heavily upon
each other. At the end of the day, what is required for a Com-
mission decision to stand in court depends on both the quantity
and quality of evidence adduced by the Commission in support
of its case (i.e., whether the standard of proof has been met),
and on the level of scrutiny exercised by the Courts (i.e., the
standard of review applied). It can be said that the more rigor-
ous the standard of review, the more likely it is that the standard
of proof will be high as well. In other words, if a court is pre-
pared to scrutinize and question, at an exacting level, all of the
Commission's factual findings, as well as its legal and economic
analysis, then it follows that the level of sophistication and accu-
racy which the Commission must reach in its investigation needs
15. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, art. 8, O.J. L 24/1, at 11 (2004).
16. See, e.g., Airtours, Case T-342/99, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2585, 2638, 133, [2002] 5
C.M.L.R. 7, 350 (holding that the Commission did not produce enough evidence to
reach its conclusion).
17. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 225, O.J. C 325/33, at 124 (2002) (stating that
"decisions given by the Court of First Instance under this paragraph may be subject to a
right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only").
2006] 1037
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to be such as to ensure that its decisions will withstand the
Courts' scrutiny. It is interesting to note how the Commission
itself recognizes this interplay between the standard of review
and the standard of proof in its appeal of the Tetra Laval CFI
decision."8 Its claim was in fact that "the standard of proof re-
quired by the Court of First Instance... exceeds the standard of
review of the legality of Community acts." 9 In other words, in
the Commission's view, the CFI has raised the standard of proof
incumbent on the Commission, by raising its own standard of
review.
II. STANDARD OF PROOF
A. General Principles
It is often repeated in the case law that the Commission
must prove its case to the "requisite legal standard."2 While this
term can be seen in virtually every judgment reviewing Commis-
sion decisions, it is inherently imprecise. In practice, the "requi-
site legal standard" will depend on the case under consideration
and the evidence available. What the Commission's decisions
must ultimately do is to achieve a standard capable of with-
standing scrutiny in the Courts, and whether this threshold has
been met will inevitably vary from case to case depending on its
complexity, the nature of arguments advanced and the theory of
harm in issue-to name but a few factors. In addition, the fact
that the EC system is based on principles common to the Mem-
ber States complicates the issue insofar as the Member States
have widely diverging standards applied in their own legal sys-
tems.21
In the common law tradition, applicable in the United King-
dom, the two most common standards of proof or reasoning,
which can act as useful comparative analytical tools also in the
context of EC merger control are: (i) proof "beyond reasonable
doubt," applicable to criminal cases; and (ii) proof "on the bal-
ance of probabilities" or on the "preponderance of the evi-
18. See Tetra Laval Appeal, supra note 7, O.J. C 70/3, at 4, 1.
19. Id.
20. Schneider Electric SA v. Commission, Case T-310/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4071,
4182, 402, [2003] 4 C.M.L.R. 17, 832.
21. This divergence may partly be behind the EC courts particular choice of vague
wording. Given the nature of the ECjudicial system, there may be advantages in avoid-
ing coloring the standard of proof according to the colors of any Member State flag.
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dence," applicable to civil cases.22 Following Napp Pharmaceutical
Holdings Ltd. and Subsidiaries v. Director Genneral of Fair Trading,23
there has been some discussion in the United Kingdom ("U.K.")
as to whether the standard applied in U.K. competition law cases
is civil or criminal. The U.K.'s Competition Appeals Tribunal
("CAT") has recently confirmed that the appropriate standard is
the civil standard, and that cases, therefore, need only be proved
on the balance of probabilities.24 However, this does not mean
that the U.K. applies a "bare balance of probabilities" standard
in competition cases. In J/B Sports v. Office of Fair Trading, the
CAT affirmed the following point made in Napp, namely that the
seriousness of the allegation must also impact upon the applica-
tion of this standard:
[Flormally speaking, the standard of proof in proceedings
under the [Competition] Act involving penalties is the civil
standard of proof, but that standard is to be applied bearing
in mind that infringements of the Act are serious matters at-
tracting severe financial penalties. It is for the [Office of Fair
Trading] to satisfy us in each case, on the basis of strong and
compelling evidence, taking account of the seriousness of
what is alleged, that the infringement is duly proved, the un-
dertaking being entitled to the presumption of innocence,
and to any reasonable doubt there may be.25
The U.K. therefore has a standard of proof in competition cases
22. There is a third standard-"manifest error or unreasonableness"-applicable
to judicial review of administrative decisions (what in the United Kingdom is known as
"Wednesbury unreasonableness," named after the synonymous case). This, however, is
a standard of review rather than a standard of proof. See Bo Vesterdorf, Standard of Proof
in Merger Cases: Reflections in the Light of Recent Case Law of the Community Courts, EUR.
COMPETITION J., Mar. 2005, 6-7; see also David Bailey, Standard of Proof in EC Merger Pro-
ceedings: A Common Law Perspective, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 845, 851-55 (2003) (dis-
cussing the difference between various standards of proof). The standard of "manifest
error or unreasonableness" would require an administrative body to have taken a deci-
sion "so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have
arrived at it." Council of Civil Serv. Unions and Others v. Minister for the Civil Serv.,
[1985] A.C. 374, 410 (H.L.).
23. Napp Pharm. Holdings Ltd. v. Dir. Gen. of Fair Trading, Case No. 1001/1/1/
01, [2002] C.A.T. 1, [2002] E.C.C. 13 (U.K. Competition Comm. App. Trib.), available
at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/documents/JdgNapp150102.pdf.
24. See JJB Sports PLC v. Office of Fair Trading, Case 1021/1/1/03, [2004] CAT
17, [2004] All E.R. (D) 17 (U.K. Competition App. Trib.), available at http://
www.catribunal.org.uk/documents/Jdgl02lUmbroOl004.pdf.
25. Id. (quoting Napp).
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which is formally that of "balance of probabilities" (i.e., the civil
law standard), although in reality this appears to be a height-
ened standard which probably falls somewhere between the civil
standard and the criminal standard of "beyond reasonable
doubt." This is a pragmatic approach insofar as it recognizes the
inherently administrative nature of competition law, while at the
same time allowing for a certain degree of flexibility, depending
on the underlying facts of each case. In practical terms, the
CAT's approach is to reiterate that the standard of proof is the
civil one for all competition cases, but that its application will
differ from case to case, in accordance with the well-established
principle of English law that unlikely and/or particularly serious
events require more convincing proof.26
This principle has also been reiterated in a merger context.
The CAT applies the ordinary principles of judicial review in
merger cases. However, the Court of Appeal has recently con-
firmed in Office of Fair Trading v. IBA Health Limited that the in-
tensity with which the principles will be applied must vary in ac-
cordance with the nature of the issues involved.27 In its prefer-
ence for flexibility over legalism the principle stated in IBA
Health is similar to that mentioned above in Napp and also to the
approach of the Court in Tetra LavalECJ.2 s In fact, in the recent
Unichem Ltd. v. Office of Fair Tradinge9 case, the CAT expressly
mentions that the approach of the Court of Appeal in IBA Health
is close to that of the Court in Tetra Laval ECJ °
The realization that in its application the "balance of
probabilities" standard can be stretched from requiring a bare
balance of probabilities (i.e., a fifty-one percent likelihood of
something occurring) to something resembling certainty, de-
pending on the underlying facts, exposes to some extent the in-
herent artificiality of the civil/criminal divide and, at the same
time, serves as a very useful tool for understanding and predict-
26. See, e.g., Sec'y of State for Home Dep't v. Rehman, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 877; Napp,
[2002] C.A.T. 1, [2002] E.C.C. 13, 107, B v. Chief Constable of Somerset and Avon,
[2003] A.C. 787; Re H [1996] A.C. 563, 586.
27. See, e.g., Office of Fair Trading v. IBA Health Ltd., [2003] C.A.T. 27, available at
http://www.catribunal.org.uk/documents/dgIBA031203.pdf.
28. See infra notes 40, 44 and accompanying text.
29. Unichem Ltd. v. Office of Fair Trading, Case 1049/4/1/05, [2005] CAT 8,
[2005] 2 All E.R. 440 (U.K Competition App. Trib.), available at http://
www.catribunal.org.uk/documents/Jdg1049Uni01042005.pdf.
30. Id. 169.
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ing not so much what the standard of proof is, but rather how it
will be applied, regardless of whether the nature of the competi-
tion proceeding in question is criminal or civil.
B. Standard of Proof in Merger Cases
It is clear under EC law that merger cases are administrative
proceedings, and that the decision taken by the Commission as
to whether to clear or prohibit them is also administrative. The
decision is undertaken in the context of the Commission acting
as regulator; fines are generally not imposed,31 and a company's
conduct is not declared illegal as it is in competition cases. How-
ever, "administrative" does not mean "inconsequential," nor
does it mean "trivial," and it is arguable that the nature of the
proceedings alone should not influence the debate on what the
appropriate standard of proof is. 2 This is not only because the
consequences of a Commission decision can be particularly seri-
ous for the undertakings concerned, but also because of the
31. Cf EC Merger Regulation, supra note 10, art. 14, O.J. L. 24/1, at 15 (2004).
Fines of up to one percent of aggregate turnover may be imposed under Article 14 for
example where an undertaking, intentionally or negligently, supplies incorrect or mis-
leading information in the course of the investigation, or fails to supply information in
response to a request made by decision under Article 11 (3). Heavier fines, of up to ten
percent of aggregate turnover, may be imposed for failing to notify a concentration
without authorization, or for implementing a concentration while the investigation is
ongoing or contrary to a decision prohibiting the concentration. A fine may also be
imposed for failing to comply with conditions or obligations set out in a Commission
decision pursuant to EC Articles 6(1)(b), 7(3), or 8(2).
32. The standard of proof under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty is not ex-
amined in any detail in this Article. It has been argued, based on the nature of Article
81 and 82 proceedings, that the standard of proof is in fact higher than the one under
the EC Merger Regulation. It is submitted that this view is not supported, however, by
the fact that the Courts have used similar wording to describe the standard of proof
under both Articles 81 and 82 and the EC Merger Regulation. See, e.g., Compagnie
Royale Asturiene des Mines SA and Rheinzink v. Commission, Case 29/83, [1984] ECR
1679 [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 688; Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission, Case C-89/85, [1993]
ECR 1-1307, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 407; Hercules v. Commission, Case T-7/89, [1991] ECR
11-1171, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84. All these cases use language similar to that found in the
merger cases referred to supra note 2. This consistency in wording supports the view
that there is in fact one standard of proof in competition law, the application of which
depends on and varies in intensity in accordance with the underlying facts. In this
sense, if one wishes to draw a distinction between Articles 81 and 82 on the one hand,
and the EC Merger Regulation on the other, the appropriate distinguishing factor is
not the nature of the proceedings (i.e., civil or criminal), but rather the temporal na-
ture of the assessment of each proceeding. This theme will be further explored in the
discussion of the ex-ante nature of merger control. See infra Part II.B.2.
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Commission's exclusive handling of the proceedings-as prose-
cutor, judge and jury, all at the same time.
In the following Sections we will consider some of the most
interesting issues and factors that influence the application and
determine the intensity of the standard of proof. In the light of
the Tetra Laval ECJjudgment, we will examine in turn whether
there is a presumption of legality in EC merger control33 which
could shift the focus from the standard of proof in borderline
cases, the importance of the ex-ante nature of review in merger
cases and, finally, whether different kinds of merger should re-
quire different standards of proof.
1. Is There a Presumption of Legality of Mergers?
Given the uncertainty inherent in the concept of "a requi-
site legal standard," any presumptions as to the legality (or ille-
gality) of mergers could serve as a useful starting point in any
attempt to articulate what the requisite standard actually is.
More importantly, a presumption can serve as a decision making
tool, to enable both the Commission and the Courts to resolve
the so-called "difficult" or "grey-area" cases. In this sense, it is
interesting to note that a clear presumption of legality would
render part of the debate on standard of proof redundant and
resolve some of the relevant issues. In genuinely borderline
cases, the Commission (or the Courts) would have clear gui-
dance as to how to proceed, in the form of a presumption of
legality. Unfortunately, as with the standard of proof, the issue
of a presumption of legality of mergers in general is not ad-
dressed expressly anywhere in the EC Merger Regulation. The
only reference to a category of mergers which "by reason of the
limited market share of the undertakings concerned" should be
deemed to be compatible with the common market is to be
found in Recital 32 of the EC Merger Regulation, which states
that a market share of twenty-five percent or below in the com-
mon market or a substantial part thereof is an indication that
the merger does not impede competition.34 Due to the fact, to
some extent, that the EC Merger Regulation is silent on the mat-
ter, various arguments have been put forward, on both sides,
33. This Article will also examine the desirability of a presumption of legality in EC
merger control.
34. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, at Recital 32, O.J. L. 24/1, at 5 (2004).
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based on interpretations of relevant EC Merger Regulation pro-
visions, the general objectives of competition and EC law in gen-
eral and opposing economic theories. In the words of Article
2(2) of the EC Merger Regulation:
A concentration which would significantly impede effective
competition, in the common market or in a substantial part
of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening
of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with
the common market.
35
Some commentators have suggested that there cannot exist any
such presumption of legality36 based on the fact that Article 2(3)
mirrors exactly the wording of Article 2(2), requiring a concen-
tration that would not significantly impede effective competition
to be declared compatible with the common market.37 In other
words, the symmetry of language points towards neutrality rather
than a presumption of legality (or illegality, for that matter).
Both provisions are meant to lay down a positive obligation on
the Commission to find a merger to be compatible or incompati-
ble, rather than allowing it to assume that if it cannot be shown
to be one then it must be the other.
It is respectfully submitted that, while this is a plausible in-
terpretation of Article 2, it can lead to very undesirable situa-
tions, which would undermine the credibility of the merger con-
trol regime. The symmetric language of Articles 2(2) and 2(3),
interpreted strictly in the above manner, would not leave any
room for doubt in the Commission's mind, and would not pro-
vide for a resolution of the cases falling within a "grey area,"
where it is uncertain whether the outcome will be pro- or anti-
competitive. In a borderline case, where a merger is neither
clearly anti-competitive nor pro-competitive, the Commission
would face the impossible situation of finding a merger to be
neither compatible nor incompatible.38 This would give the par-
adoxical result that cases falling within such a grey area could
not be resolved under the EC Merger Regulation.
39
Furthermore, Article 10(6) of the EC Merger Regulation re-
35. See id. art. 2(2), O.J. L. 24/1, at 7 (2004).
36. See, Bailey, supra note 22, at 878.
37. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, art. 2(2)-(3), O.J. L. 24/1, at 7 (2004).
38. Or, depending on one's perspective, finding it to be both compatible and in-
compatible at the same time.
39. Attorney General Tizzano expressed himself in similar terms in his Opinion in
10432006]
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quires that where the Commission does not reach a decision as
to the compatibility of a merger with the common market,
within the timeframe laid down in the EC Merger Regulation,
the merger shall be deemed compatible with the common mar-
ket.4" It has been argued that this provision is simply a penalty
for inaction and an application of the equitable principle that a
party who fails to act cannot benefit from its inaction. In other
words, the argument is that Article 10(6) could not have been
phrased in any other way, as it would have been manifestly unfair
to the parties if the Commission were allowed to reach a decision
outside the time limits that it has imposed on itself.41 Article
10(6) certainly cannot be said to establish a presumption of le-
gality on its own, as it relates to a particular procedural point
(that of inactivity on the part of the Commission). 42 However, it
provides a further indication of the intention behind the EC
Merger Regulation that mergers shall be lawful unless deemed
otherwise by the Commission within the timeframe set out
therein.
Advocate General Tizzano interestingly expresses his argu-
ments in favor of a presumption of legality in terms of the risks
involved: "[I]t has been thought preferable to run the risk of
authorising a transaction incompatible with the common mar-
ket, rather than the risk of prohibiting one that is compatible, so
unjustifiably restraining the parties' freedom of economic activ-
ity.43
As noted, the decision to prohibit a merger has serious con-
sequences for the notifying parties, as it impacts upon the gen-
eral right to own property, recognized in EC law. In the EC
Treaty, Article 295 sets out the general principle that it "shall in
no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the sys-
tem of property ownership."44 In addition, Article 17(1) of the
European Union ("EU") Charter of Fundamental Rights4 5 also
Tetra Laval ECJ delivered on May 25, 2004. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Tetra
Laval ECJ, Case C-12/03 P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-987, 76.
40. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, art. 10(6), O.J. L. 24/1, at 13 (2004).
41. See, e.g., Vesterdorf, supra note 22, at 29-30.
42. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, art. 10(6), O.J. L. 24/1, at 13 (2004).
43. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Tetra LavalECJ, Case C-12/03 P, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-987, 79.
44. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 295, O.J. C 325/33, at 148 (2002).
45. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 17(1), O.J. C
364/1, at 12 (2000) [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. The Charter does
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sets out that:
Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath
his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be de-
prived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest
and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by
law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for
their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so
far as is necessary for the general interest.4 6
The general principles of freedom of property ownership set out
above clearly suggest a presumption in favor of the freedom to
own and acquire property. Finally, in accordance with the prin-
ciple of proportionality, Recital 6 to the EC Merger Regulation
supports such an interpretation. It states that the EC Merger
Regulation "does not go beyond what is necessary in order to
achieve the objective of ensuring that competition in the com-
mon market is not distorted, in accordance with the principle of
an open market economy with free competition."4 7
This Recital further supports the presumption that mergers
notified under the EC Merger Regulation must be presumed
lawful unless the Article 2(2) criteria are met. It underlines the
principle of "an open market economy with free competition,"
and states that the EC Merger Regulation will not go beyond
what is necessary to achieve this, (i.e., presumably to block anti-
competitive mergers, but to allow all others, which will account
for the vast majority), including mergers falling within the grey
area.
4 8
not have an official status under the EC Treaty. However, it has significant persuasive
force, and it is arguable that a legitimate expectation exists that the Charter will be
observed by the Commission in merger proceedings. In this context, for example, the
Charter is expressly mentioned in the preamble of the Commission decision on the
terms of reference of hearing officers in competition cases. See Commission Decision
No. 2001/462/EC, ECSC, pmbl. 2, 0J. L 162/21 (2001). In this context, it should be
noted that the right to property is not absolute and in fact, may be in conflict in some
cases with other objectives of the EC Treaty, such as the objective of undistorted compe-
tition under Article 3(1) (g), or the establishment of the common market. EC Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 3(1) (g), O.J. C 325/33, at 40 (2002) (stating that the EC shall include
"a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted"). Thus, no
one can argue that the protection of the right to property is a conclusive reason on its
own in favor of a presumption of legality. It is merely advocated that a presumption of
legality of mergers is compatible with this fundamental right.
46. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 45, art. 17(1) OJ. C 364/1, at 12
(2000).
47. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, Recital 6, 0.J. L. 24/1, at 1 (2004).
48. See id.
2006] 1045
1046 FORDHAMINTERNA TIONALLAWJOURVAL [Vol. 29:1034
On a theoretical level, it has been fiercely contested
whether it is preferable for the Commission to allow an anti-com-
petitive merger (a "Type 2 error") or to prohibit a pro-competi-
tive merger (a "Type 1 error").4 It has been argued that a Type
1 error is the lesser evil in that it only harms the interests of the
parties rather than consumers or the whole of the economy.5 °
There exist strong arguments, however, against a preference for
Type 1 errors. First, it disregards the fact that a pro-competitive
merger may benefit consumers in a number of ways,5" thus. re-
sulting in direct harm not only to the parties, but to consumers
as well. At the same time, it is easy to exaggerate the possible
harm to consumers and the competitive environment if one for-
gets that the Type 1/Type 2 error debate only arises in difficult,
grey-area cases where by definition the merger in question is not
clearly anti-competitive (hence the need to discuss errors). By
the same token, this view undermines the fact that the effects of
a prohibition may be devastating on the parties, which in turn
could have repercussions in the long run for the industry in
question. Furthermore, as discussed above, it has been recog-
nized in the EC Treaty that encroachment of property rights can
only occur in exceptional circumstances.
Most importantly, opting for a Type 1 error is an irreversible
decision. Conversely, a Type 2 error provides some scope for
rectification by way of EC Treaty Article 82, regarding the abuse
of a dominant position.5 2 If a merger proves to be anticompeti-
tive, the Commission has the opportunity to address any issues
that have arisen under Article 82, thus mitigating the conse-
quences of its previous error.53
Utilizing many of the arguments mentioned above, Advo-
cate General Tizzano has been very forward in his support for a
49. See Alberto Pera & Vito Auricchio, Consumer Welfare, Standard of Proof and the
Objectives of Competition Policy, EUR. COMPETITION J., Mar. 2005, at 162-163 (discussing
Type 1 and Type 2 errors).
50. See, e.g., id. at 168.
51. A pro-competitive merger may, for example, create significant efficiencies in
the fields of distribution, research and development, and pricing.
52. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 82, O.J. C 325/33, at 65 (2002) (stating how
an anti-competitive merger, such as one created by a Type 2 error, would be struck
down by EC law).
53. See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Tetra Laval ECJ, Case C-12/03 P,
[2004] E.C.R. 1-987, 81 (stating that anti-competitive mergers can be dealt with expost
by Article 86, and by extension, Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty).
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presumption of legality in merger cases. In his opinion, in cases
"of doubtful or difficult classification ... the most correct solu-
tion is quite certainly to authorise the notified transactions." 4
Unfortunately, the ECJ has not seized the historic opportu-
nity presented to it to clarify this matter beyond doubt. Al-
though both the Commission and the Attorney General refer to
the subject,55 the ECJ chose not to mention the issue in its judg-
ment and refrained from unequivocally stating that a presump-
tion of legality exists in Commission merger control, thus leaving
open the question of how to best deal with a case where the
Commission is uncertain whether the merger under review is in
fact compatible or incompatible with the Common Market. It is
submitted that, for the reasons outlined above, a presumption of
legality would be an appropriate tool for dealing with such cases.
2. Ex Ante Nature of Review
It has been argued that the standard of proof is higher
under EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82 than it is under the EC
Merger Regulation.56 One of the reasons is the ex-post nature of
Article 81 or 82 investigations and the availability of evidence.5
Commission investigations into possible infringements of
Article 81 and 82 are a long process, involving a large amount of
fact-finding via on-site inspections, requests for information,
market surveys and questionnaires, interviews, the eventual issu-
ance of a Statement of Objections and an Oral Hearing, prior to
the issuance of a decision. The process typically takes years. Evi-
dence must be adduced in support of the case the Commission is
bringing, which is based in the main part on facts discovered
during the administrative procedure. To the extent that eco-
nomic theories or models are relied upon, they seek to under-
line the conduct for which some evidence already exists. There
54. Id. 76-77.
55. Tetra Laval ECJ, Case C-12/03 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-917, 29 (describing the
Commission's argument that the symmetrical language of Article 2 of EC Merger Regu-
lation "reflects the intention of the [EC] legislature to protect equally the private inter-
ests of the parties to the concentration and the public interest in maintaining effective
competition and in consumer protection").
56. See, e.g., Philip Lowe, Address at The Fordham Annual Conference on Interna-
tional Antitrust Law & Policy, The Substantive Standard for Merger Control and the Treat-
ment of Efficiencies [sic] in Merger Analysis: An EU Perspective (2002), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2002_039_en.pdf at 3, 8-9
57. See id. at 8-9.
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is therefore less room for speculation than, for example, in a
merger investigation that is by its very nature forward-looking."
Does this mean that mergers, which are investigated ex ante and
which therefore necessarily entail projections as to future market
shares, behavior on the market, etc. should require more or less
evidence as a basis for a prohibition decision?
On the one hand, the forward-looking nature of the review
suggests that the standard of proof required to block a merger
should be met with less evidence. The evidence that will be
available to the Commission in making its assessment will largely
depend on economic theory and modeling as to the likely evolu-
tion of the market: no two economists will agree precisely on
the likely outcome, and in several cases opinions may diverge
widely. Consequently, if the Commission is required to prove its
case to an exigent standard of proof, it will never be able to pro-
hibit a merger, even if there is a general consensus that it will be
anti-competitive.
On the other hand, however, there are dangers in accepting
less evidence in such cases simply to take account of the difficul-
ties involved in assessing mergers ex ante. Indeed, Tetra Laval
ECJ acknowledged the forward-looking nature of assessing merg-
ers, but concluded that a more (not less) careful review is neces-
sary:
A prospective analysis of the kind necessary in merger
control must be carried out with great care since it does not
entail the examination of past events-for which often many
items of evidence are available which make it possible to un-
derstand the causes--or of current events, but rather a predic-
tion of events which are more or less likely to occur in future
if a decision prohibiting the planned concentration or laying
down the conditions for it is not adopted.
Thus, the prospective analysis consists of an examination
of how a concentration might alter the factors determining
the state of competition on a given market in order to estab-
lish whether it would give rise to a serious impediment to ef-
58. It is interesting to note however, that past conduct may be very difficult to
prove in some cases. The classic example is that of a cartel, where the parties know full
well the consequences of their actions and make conscious efforts to avoid docu-
menting their practices. In such cases, a high standard of proof would make it very
difficult for the Commission to prosecute a cartel. See Aalborg Portland A/S Others v
Comm'n, Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P
and C-219/00 P, [2004] E.C.K 1-123, 55-57.
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fective competition. Such an analysis makes it necessary to
envisage various chains of cause and effect with a view to as-
certaining which of them are the most likely.59
While future projections may be difficult to make, companies
should not be penalized for the difficulties the Commission has
with assessing them. Nor should the strict time limits be used as
a reason for lowering the threshold for prohibition for compa-
nies falling within the EC Merger Regulation's jurisdiction. The
Commission had the opportunity to adjust the time limits within
which it must review a notified merger when it revised the EC
Merger Regulation last year, but it did little substantively to
change these limits. As a result, a decision must still be reached
within twenty-five to thirty-five days (Phase 1) or approximately
five to six months (Phase 2). The Commission should not now
be allowed to invoke this tight timeframe in favor of lowering the
standard of proof incumbent upon it.
The conclusion that prospective analysis necessitates a
higher standard of proof flows inexorably from the principle dis-
cussed above-that predictions as to possible future effects re-
quire more convincing proof. Suppositions, absent any cogent
and convincing evidence, will not suffice.
3. Different Standards for Different Kinds of Mergers?
A further point to be considered is whether the evidence
required to prohibit a merger can or should vary according to
whether the merger under consideration is horizontal, vertical
or conglomerate. Both the language used by the Courts and the
principles discussed above indicate that the approach to stan-
dard of proof in competition law is a unified one and can be
distilled to the following simple proposition: Has the Commis-
sion brought enough convincing and coherent evidence-
whether factual or economic, given the facts of the specific case,
to prove that the merger under review is incompatible (or com-
patible) with the common market?6 0 It is interesting in this
sense to group mergers according to their "type," because it al-
lows us to focus on the underlying characteristics which most
59. Tetra LavalECJ, Case C-12/03 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-917, 42-43 (paragraph num-
bers omitted).
60. Or, has the infringement of Articles 81 or 82 of the EC Merger Regulation that
the Commission alleges in fact occurred?
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mergers of a given type will have, and it is these underlying char-
acteristics that dictate the level of proof required of the Commis-
sion."
Certain horizontal mergers are in many ways arguably more
straightforward in their effects than are vertical or conglomerate
mergers since, provided the market is correctly defined, it is pos-
sible to ascertain the undertakings' market shares post-merger.
Although market shares are not the only relevant criteria in as-
sessing horizontal mergers, they, nevertheless, provide a first
proxy of the post-merger market situation. Arguably, the assess-
ment is often less prone to speculative theories of harm because
the presumed anticompetitive effects in the market are immedi-
ate: the market structure will change with the elimination of a
competitor.62
Where horizontal cases also involve certain expected behav-
ior by the undertakings (in particular, collective dominance
cases), the Commission's analysis is based in part upon the cur-
rent conditions of the market but also, in large part, on predic-
tions as to the parties' (and other market players') future behav-
ior. This renders the analysis inherently more speculative. In
such instances, the CFI has emphasized that the more remote
the likelihood of the conduct is, the greater the evidence the
Commission must adduce in order to support its theory. In
other words, theories of harm based on the parties' alleged fu-
ture behavior require more convincing evidence for the merger
to be prohibited, and this is the decisive factor in shaping the
standard of proof, rather than the fact that the merger in ques-
tion is a horizontal one. Thus, in Kali & Salz,6" the ECJ held
that the Commission's decision was not supported by a "suffi-
ciently cogent and consistent body of evidence" and, therefore,
61. See Bailey, supra note 22 at 853 (noting that even if the same standard of proof
is applied, it is easier to prove things that are inherently more likely to happen than
those that are not); see also Sec'y of State for Home Dept. v. Rehman, [2002] 3 W.L.R.
877, 895 (Eng.) (stating, for example, that it would require more convincing evidence
to conclude that it was more likely than not that the sighting of an animal in a park was
a lion, than it would to satisfy the same standard of probability that the animal was a
dog).
62. One can of course debate what the precise effects of a transaction will be and
whether the change will be appreciable, however such discussion is beyond the scope of
this Article.
63. France v. Commission, Joined Cases C-68/94 & 30/95, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1375,
[1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 829 [hereinafter Kali & Salz].
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did not meet the standard required for a collective dominance
theory to be upheld.64
Similarly, in Airtours, the CFI placed a high standard of
proof on the Commission, requiring it to show that three cumu-
lative conditions are fulfilled before prohibiting a merger based
on collective dominance concerns.65 First, each member of the
dominant oligopoly must have the ability to know how the other
members are behaving; there must be sufficient market trans-
parency for all members of the dominant oligopoly to be aware,
sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way in which the other
members' market conduct is evolving. Second, the situation of
tacit coordination must be sustainable over time; that is to say,
there must be an incentive not to depart from the common pol-
icy on the market (existence of a credible monitoring and retali-
ation mechanism). Third, the foreseeable reaction of current
and future competitors, as well as of consumers, must not be
such as to jeopardize the results expected from the common pol-
icy.
In this respect, the Airtours decision is an important signal
to the Commission about the need for rigor in its decisions. It
also shows that questions of standard of proof are not merely
academic but have a profound effect on the outcome of litiga-
tion. It is certainly no coincidence that since Airtours the Com-
mission has been reluctant to challenge any case based on a the-
ory of collective dominance.66
The analysis of vertical or conglomerate mergers differs
from many horizontal mergers in the key respect that there is no
addition of market shares. For conglomerate mergers, the ECJ
recently confirmed the standard set by the CFI in Tetra Laval
FI, stating that the standard of proof incumbent upon the
Commission is the same as the standard for horizontal mergers,
but that in the case of conglomerate mergers this standard will
be more difficult to fulfill and will require a correspondingly
64. Id. 1 228.
65. See Airtours, Case T-342/99, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2585, 1 62, [2002] 5 C.M.L.R. 317.
66. The Sony/BMG merger-the only merger since Airtours to go to Phase 2 on
the basis of alleged collective dominance concerns-was eventually cleared without
commitments. See Commission Decision No. 4064/89/EEC (2004) (Sony/BMG).
Other cases, such as the recent Pernod Ricard/Allied Domecq decision, suggest that the
Commission considers the Airtours criteria exceedingly difficult to fulfill, as the parties
need only show that one of the criteria is not met in order for the Commission's entire
collective dominance theory to come unstuck.
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higher quality of evidence to show that the merger will have anti-
competitive effects. It is submitted that this must also be true for
vertical mergers insofar as the analytical framework is similar. In
this respect it is interesting to compare the slight nuances in lan-
guage that can be identified when comparing the CFI and the
ECJ decisions. The CFI's approach is set out in the following
paragraphs:
the analysis of potentially anti-competitive conglomerate ef-
fects of a merger transaction raises a certain number of spe-
cific problems relating to the nature of such a transaction.67
in a prospective analysis of the effects of a conglomer-
ate-type merger transaction, if the Commission is able to con-
clude that a dominant position would, in all likelihood, be
created or strengthened in the relatively near future and
would lead to effective competition on the market being sig-
nificantly impeded, it must prohibit it. .6
In this connection, the CFI also found that the evidence the
Commission must bring in conglomerate cases is comparable to
that required for collective dominance:
The Commission's analysis of a merger producing a conglom-
erate effect is conditioned by requirements similar to those
defined by the Court with regard to the creation of a situation
of collective dominance (Kali & Salz, paragraph 222; and
Airtours, paragraph 63). Thus the Commission's analysis of a
merger transaction, which is expected to have an anti-com-
petitive conglomerate effect, calls for a particularly close ex-
amination of the circumstances, which are relevant for an as-
sessment of that effect on the conditions of competition in
the reference market. As the Court has already held, where
the Commission takes the view that a merger should be pro-
hibited because it will create or strengthen a dominant posi-
tion within a foreseeable period, it is incumbent upon it to
produce convincing evidence thereof (Airtours, paragraph
63). Since the effects of a conglomerate-type merger are gen-
erally considered to be neutral, or even beneficial, for compe-
tition on the markets concerned, as is recognized in the pre-
sent case by the economic writings cited in the analyses an-
nexed to the parties' written pleadings, the proof of anti-
67. Tetra Laval CPY, Case T-05/02, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4381, 1 147, [2002] 5 C.M.L.R
28, 1223.
68. Id. 153.
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competitive conglomerate effects of such a merger calls for a
precise examination, supported by convincing evidence, of
the circumstances which allegedly produce those effects (see,
by analogy, Airtours, paragraph 63).69
... In addition, since the anticipated dominant position
would only emerge after a certain lapse of time, by 2005 ac-
cording to the Commission, its analysis of the future position
must, whilst allowing for a certain margin of discretion, be
particularly plausible. 70
The language used by the CFI in the passages cited above shows
that to prohibit a conglomerate merger the Commission is re-
quired to show, first, that it undertook a very careful examina-
tion of the facts ("particularly close examination; "precise ex-
amination"); second, that the conclusions it drew from this were
based on "convincing evidence;" third, that the anti-competitive
effects were likely to occur ("in all likelihood"); and fourth, that
they would occur within the "relatively near future." While not
setting a precise benchmark, this sets a very high standard for
the Commission to meet. It is arguable whether the constant
references to the particular facts of the case suggest that the pre-
ceding paragraphs are not a description of the standard of proof
generally, but rather an explanation of how the standard would
be applied if a case similar to Tetra Laval CFI was brought in the
future.
The Commission appealed the CFI's judgment for this very
reason, claiming that the CFI had "significantly raised the level
of standard of proof required from the Commission to prohibit
a conglomerate merger."71 On appeal, however, the ECJ found
that:
... the Court of First Instance was right to find, in paragraph
155 of the judgment under appeal, in reliance on, in particu-
lar, the judgment in Kali & Salz, that the Commission's analy-
sis of a merger producing a conglomerate effect is subject to
requirements similar to those defined by the Court with re-
gard to the creation of a situation of collective dominance
and that it calls for a close examination of the circumstances
which are relevant for an assessment of that effect on the con-
69. Id. 155 (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. 162.
71. Tetra Laval Appeal, supra note 7, O.J. C 70/3, at 4 (2003).
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ditions of competition on the reference market. Although
the Court of First Instance stated, in paragraph 155, that
proof of anti-competitive conglomerate effects of a merger of
the kind notified calls for a precise examination, supported
by convincing evidence of the circumstances which allegedly
produce those effects, it by no means added a condition relat-
ing to the requisite standard of proof but merely drew atten-
tion to the essential function of evidence, which is to establish
convincingly the merits of an argument or, as in the present
case, of a decision on a merger. 72
What is undisputed is that the ECJ, to a large extent, agrees
with the substance of the CFI's assessment regarding the appro-
priate standard of proof. Interestingly, however, the language
that the ECJ uses is not quite as strong as the CFI's language.
For example, the ECJ refers to a "close examination" of the cir-
cumstances as opposed to a "particularly close examination." In
paragraph 42 of its judgment, the ECJ, referring to the Commis-
sion's analysis of conglomerate mergers, stresses that they "must
be carried out with great care ' 73 while the CFI prefers the ex-
pression "precise examination supported by convincing evi-
dence."74 While perhaps the choice of words by the ECJ points
to an intention to avoid linguistic extremes, it is submitted that
the ECJ's slightly more subdued language does not subtract any-
thing from the force of the central message which both the CFI
and ECJ delivered to the Commission: in situations where the
effect of a merger is not clearly anticompetitive, 76 and in particu-
lar where that effect is only predicted to occur in the future,77
the Commission will need to have a particularly convincing case
in order to withstand the Courts' scrutiny. This is not "because
of a new or heightened legal standard of proof."7 It is simply
the manifestation of a natural process of evolution, whereby the
Courts respond to the increasing sophistication of competition
72. Tetra Laval ECJ, Case C-12/03 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-987, 40-41, [2005] 4
C.M.L.R. 8, 638-39.
73. Id. 42.
74. Tetra Laval CF, Case T-05/02, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4381, 155, [2002] 5 C.M.L.R
28, 1225.
75. An intention that in the institutional context of the EC is very understandable.
76. For example, in a conglomerate merger scenario.
77. Note that the further in the future the predicted effect, the more convincing
the evidence must be to support the prediction.
78. See Vesterdorf, supra note 22, at 33.
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law, economic theory and of the fact-finding resources available
to the Commission.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As discussed above, the standard of judicial review of the
Commission's decisions is a theoretically distinct but clearly re-
lated concept to the standard of proof.7 9 The standard of review
relates to the Courts' judgment as to whether or not the Com-
mission's decision can stand, i.e., the Courts' assessment of
whether the Commission has met the standard of proof incum-
bent upon it. In practical terms, it has been recognized that the
standard of review is linked to the standard of proof in the sense
that, for example, the Court cannot demand of the Commission
to prove its case to a very exacting standard and then only exer-
cise superficial judicial review."0 Tetra Laval ECJ indicates that
the standard of review and proof will be considered, pragmati-
cally, to form part of the wider question: "Has the Commission
established a convincing case?" It also stands for the Courts un-
willingness to engage in linguistic or theoretical debates about
the differences in the two concepts. Prior to examining this par-
ticular aspect of the Tetra Laval decisions and their implications,
however-and to the extent that it is possible to isolate the dis-
cussion of standard of review from that of standard of proof-it
is worth briefly summarizing the precise scope of the review ex-
ercised by the Courts.
A. Appeal/Judicial Review
It is worth clarifying at the outset the use of different termi-
nology relating to the Courts' review of Commission decisions.
An "appeal" involves the decision or judgment in question being
brought before the courts in order for them to review the law
and facts upon which the decision or judgment is based. The
Courts will, if necessary, overturn the decision or judgment and
replace its own findings for that of the first instance decision-
maker. Judicial review, on the other hand, refers to an applica-
tion made to a court to review the legality of an administrative
79. See supra Part I.A.
80. See, Vesterdorf, supra note 22, at 6-8.
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body's decision." The review does not involve a discussion of
the facts and law in the way an appeal on the merits does.
Rather, it involves a hands-off review, requiring the court review-
ing the decision only to look at whether the decision is so unrea-
sonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have made it.
The EC Treaty provision giving authority for acts of the
Community institutions (including the Commission) to be re-
viewed by the Community judicature is Article 230.2 This Arti-
cle gives the Community Courts power to review (inter alia)
Commission decisions on the following grounds: lack of compe-
tence, misuse of powers, infringement of an essential procedural
requirement, or infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law
relating to its application." The terminology used in Article 230
and the Statute of the Court of Justice (also applicable to the
CFI) shows that parties apply for the legality of Commission deci-
sions to be reviewed by the CFI, and can subsequently appeal
that judgment to the ECJ on points of law.8 4 In this sense, the
initial review by the CF185 is, in some respects, akin to a judicial
review, and cases are brought before the ECJ as appeals on
points of law.86
Applications to the Court that deal with substantive issues,
as opposed to procedural issues, relate primarily to alleged er-
rors of law, errors of fact and errors of appreciation. Histori-
cally, the standard of review applied to each has been considered
to be different, and therefore we consider these separately be-
low. It should be noted, however, that there is no clear line dis-
cernible between the three-for example, where the Commis-
81. See Mark Clough, The Role ofJudicial Review in Merger Control, 24 Nw. J. INr'L L.
& Bus. 729, 729-30 (2004).
82. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 230, O.J. C 325/33, at 126 (2002).
83. See id.
84. Under Article 56 of the Statute, "an appeal may be brought before the Court of
Justice" from ajudgment of the CFI. Under Article 58 of the Statute, appeals to the ECJ
must be on points of law only, "on the grounds of lack of competence of the Court of
First Instance, a breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of
the appellant as well as the infringement of Community law by the Court of First In-
stance." Protocol on the Statute of the Court ofJustice, arts. 56, 58, OJ. C 325/167, at
179-80 (2002) (annexed to the Consolidated TEU and the Consolidated EC Treaty).
85. Or, exceptionally, by the ECJ, depending on the party appealing the decision.
See, e.g., Kali & Salz, Joined Cases C-68/94 & 30/95, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1375.
86. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Tetra Laval ECJ, Case C-i 2/03
P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-987, 59.
STANDARDS OF PROOF
sion has made an error of fact, its appreciation of the (errone-
ous) facts is also likely to be incorrect.
B. Errors of Law
Errors of law can be considered by both the CFI and, on
appeal, the ECJ.8 7 Appreciation of the law is the sole compe-
tence of the Courts. 8 Therefore, where the Courts consider the
Commission's decision to be predicated on an erroneous assess-
ment of the law they will replace the Commission's interpreta-
tion with their own. In this respect, the standard of review is at
its highest vis-A-vis questions of law.89
That errors of law remain entirely subject to review by the
Courts is consistent with the provisions of the EC Treaty granting
the Community Courts competence to construe its provisions,
and with Member States' own legal systems, where questions of
law are subject ultimately to interpretation by the courts.
C. Errors of Fact
Errors of fact, on the other hand, are subject only to review
by the CFI, as appeals to the ECJ may be on matters of law only,
as noted above. Although past and present market conditions
and behavior are of course relevant to a merger investigation,
the EC Merger Regulation requires the Commission to show that
the merger will significantly impede effective competition, thus
requiring a forward-looking assessment.9" Moreover, mergers
typically raise questions of an economic nature. The Courts
have consistently held that the Commission enjoys a margin of
discretion in its assessment of matters of an economic nature.
However, this margin of discretion is not unlimited. It is
carefully circumscribed by what the Commission is authorized to
do under the EC Merger Regulation. 91 The EC Merger Regula-
87. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 225, O.J. C 325/33, at 124 (2002).
88. See id. art. 220, O.J. C 325/33, at 122 (2002).
89. For examples of cases where the Courts have annulled Commission decisions
on the basis of an error of law see Nungesser v. Commission, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R.
2015, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 278, and Suiker Unie v. Commission, Case 40/73, [1975] E.C.R.
1663, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 295.
90. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2, art. 2(3), O.J. L. 24/1, at 7 (2004).
91. It is also arguable that the Commission has limited its own discretion by pub-
lishing notices and guidelines in relation to its interpretation of certain types of merg-
ers or aspects of the EC Merger Regulation. See, e.g., Guidelines on the Assessment of
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tion lays down a substantive test which must be applied by the
Commission in every case. If the test is met, the Commission
must approve the merger, if it is not, the Commission must pro-
hibit it unless it accepts remedial action by the undertakings con-
cerned.
The delineation and definition of this discretion is becom-
ing increasingly important as the Commission and the merging
parties frequently rely on economic analyses and modelling to
show that the merger will or will not lead to anti-competitive ef-
fects. In view of the margin of discretion, it has been suggested
that the CFI's review of the facts upon which the Commission's
decision is based (which is inherently tied up with its assessment
of them) must be relatively hands-off, i.e., the Court should be
hesitant to conclude that the Commission has erroneously inter-
preted the facts before it.
In practice, however, the CFI has increasingly scrutinized
the "facts" upon which the Commission relies. This is demon-
strated, for instance, in the Airtours and Tetra Laval CFIjudg-
ments of 2002. The judgment in Tetra Laval ECJ also indicates
that factual errors include not only inaccurate or incomplete in-
formation, but also the erroneous interpretation of such infor-
mation.9 2 As the scrutiny of errors of fact is linked to the scru-
tiny of the Commission's assessment of the facts, this point will
be considered further below. At this stage, however, it can be
noted that the CFI is right to look at errors of fact on the face of
the record (and the interpretation of them), and to challenge
Commission decisions on this basis. Although not all the "facts"
in a merger investigation are necessarily clear cut, it cannot be
right that the Commission's understanding of the evidence put
before it goes unchecked. A good example of judicial review of
the alleged facts of a case is the CFI's review of the Airtours deci-
sion.9" There, the Court discovered numerous examples of
Commission errors. Discussing the Commission's assessment of
a study on demand for short-haul packaged holidays, for exam-
ple, the CFI remarked that:
[I] t is apparent from a cursory examination of that document
Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, O.J. C 31/5 (2004).
92. See Clough, supra note 81, at 753-54.
93. See Airtours, Case T-342/99, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2585, [2002] 5 C.M.L.R. 7.
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that the Commission's reading of it was inaccurate. Thus, at
paragraph 92 of the Decision, it states that it also noted that
the overall average annual growth rate . ..was quite low,
whilst no statement to that effect is made in the extract sent
to the Court. Conversely, the Commission ignored the em-
phasis placed by the author of the extract on the massive in-
crease in foreign holiday sales that has taken place over the
last twenty years. It follows that the Commission construed
that document without having regard to its actual wording
and overall purpose, even though it decided to include it as a
document crucial to its finding that the rate of market growth
was moderate in the 1990s and would continue to be so. 4
This makes clear that the CFI will indeed look at the facts upon
which the Commission bases its decision and examine whether
the Commission erroneously stated those facts and consequently
came to an incorrect conclusion as to the competitive effects of
the merger. Where it does, this may be a ground for annulling
the decision (as was the case in Airtours), provided that the er-
rors identified go to the heart of the case and that the Commis-
sion's decision is no longer coherent and defensible, on the ba-
sis of the remaining elements of the case.
While the CFI's willingness to engage with the Commis-
sion's findings of fact is a welcome trend, it has raised one inter-
esting question for the future, as illustrated by Tetra Laval ECJ.
In its decision, the ECJ found the Commission's challenge of the
CFI's findings to be partly inadmissible, 95 to the extent that it
required the ECJ to "call into question the Court of First In-
stance's assessment of the evidence, which cannot be the subject
of review by the court in appeal proceedings."96 The ECJ's un-
willingness to scrutinize the CFI's assessment of evidence is
hardly surprising, in light of the fact that the ECJ does not adju-
dicate on questions of fact. While this principle is well estab-
lished, it is arguable that questions of fact can sometimes be re-
cast as questions of law.97 The extent to which the ECJ will be
94. Id. 130.
95. Tetra Laval ECJ, Case C-12/03 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-917, 105.
96. Tetra Laval ECJ, Case C-12/03 P, [2005 E.C.R. 1-917, 104.
97. For example, whether the CFI has correctly assessed the facts or not is a ques-
tion of fact. However, if there is evidence suggesting that it has effectively substituted its
own assessment for that of the Commission, then arguably the issue becomes a legal
one in the sense that the CFI can be said to have overstepped its jurisdiction and acted
ultra vires. This is in essence what the Commission argued in Tetra Laval ECJ. If how-
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amenable to such attempts to merge issues of fact and law is cer-
tainly a question for the future, the answer hinging on the level
of self-restraint of the CFI, on the one hand, and the level of
tolerance of the ECJ on the other hand, to attempts by the CFI
to replace the Commission's view with its own.
D. Error of Appreciation
Related to the question of errors of fact is the question of
errors of appreciation. As set out above, errors of fact and of
appreciation are very closely linked and, to some degree, the
separation of the two concepts is merely semantics.98
Throughout the case law, the CFI has annulled Commission
decisions where they contain "errors of assessment."99  The
meaning of this term has evolved over time: as the CFI increas-
ingly probes the factual basis of Commission decisions, it increas-
ingly finds erroneous conclusions drawn on the basis of these
facts. This necessarily impacts upon the delicate division of
power between the Commission and the Courts: it is the Com-
mission which is charged with the assessment of the case and
which must take a decision, subject to judicial review by the
Courts. The Commission therefore has some degree of freedom
(or "margin of appreciation") in understanding the facts as
presented to it and in drawing conclusions from them, in partic-
ular as regards decisions of an economic nature. The ECJ laid
down in Kali & Salz, and has emphasized in judgments (such as
Gencor, Airtours, Tetra Laval ECJ, etc.) since then, that the Com-
mission's investigation of a merger involves making assessments
of an economic nature.1"' The Commission, therefore, must be
granted some margin of appreciation in its assessments of
merger cases:
[T]he basic provisions of the [Merger] Regulation, in particu-
ever, this argument is never allowed to succeed, there is a risk that the CFI's own errors
of fact could be unchecked, and this is a risk equal in gravity to that of the Commis-
sion's errors not being addressed. Equally, the legal qualification of facts by the CFI is
also subject to review by the ECJ.
98. See supra Section II.B.
99. See e.g., Tetra Laval CPY, Case T-05/02, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4381, 7 134, 140, 141,
197-9, 283, 308, 335-6; see also Airtours, Case T-342/99, [20021 E.C.R. 11-2585, 77 26, 32,
65, 120, 181-2, 294; Gencor Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-102/96, [1999] E.C.R. 11-879,
245.
100. See Kali & Salz, Joined Cases C-68/94 & 30/95, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1375, 151
(describing the Commission's "economic assessment").
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lar Article 2 thereof, confer on the Commission a certain dis-
cretion, especially with respect to assessments of an economic
nature. Consequently, review by the Community judicature
of the exercise of that discretion, which is essential for defin-
ing the rules on concentrations, must take account of the dis-
cretionary margin implicit in the provisions of an economic
nature which form part of the rules on concentrations."'
01
Regrettably, to date, the Courts have not provided guidance
on the precise scope of the Commission's discretion and on
what specific issues the Commission enjoys such discretion. It is
hoped that the Courts will provide clarity on the issue in the
future, in the wake of the Tetra Laval decisions. Below we offer
some remarks on the possible implications of the Tetra Laval ECJ
judgment.
E. The Impact of Tetra Laval ECJ
1. The Merger of Standard of Review with Standard of Proof
Tetra Laval ECJ offers valuable insights into the ECJ's think-
ing on questions of standards of review and standard of proof.
On a general level, it is evident that the ECJ's intention is to
approach issues of proof pragmatically and not to be con-
strained by conceptual or linguistic issues. As explained above,
the Commission argued in its appeal that the CFI had wrongly
raised the standard of proof via the application of a heightened
standard of review.10 2 Before rejecting this argument,10 3 the ECJ
made it clear that what matters is the overall strength of the
Commission's case and not the presumed dichotomy between
standard of proof and standard of review:
Although the Court of First Instance stated, in paragraph 155,
that proof of anti-competitive conglomerate effects of a
merger of the kind notified calls for a precise examination,
supported by convincing evidence, of the circumstances
101. Kali & Salz, Joined Cases C-68/94 & 30/95, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1375, 1 223-24,
[1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at 829; Gencor, [1999] E.C.R. 11-879, 164-65; Airtours, Case T-342/
99, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2585, 7 64.
102. Which, in the Commission's view, amounted to substituting the CFI's view for
that of the Commission. See Tetra Laval Appeal, supra note 7, O.J. C 70/3, at 4, 1 1
(2003) ("[I]n the application of this standard ofjudicial review, the Court of First In-
stance exceeded the role of the Community Courts... in particular by substituting its
view for that of the Commission on a number of central points.").
103. Tetra Laval ECJ, Case C-12/03 P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-987, 11 48-51.
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which allegedly produce those effects, it by no means added a
condition relating to the requisite standard of proof but
merely drew attention to the essential function of evidence,
which is to establish convincingly the merits of an argument
or, as in the present case, of a decision on a merger.
10 4
As the ECJ repeats in various paragraphs, it is the "quality of evi-
dence" that matters. 10 5 The Opinion of Advocate General Tiz-
zano is in similar vein. 10 6 In Advocate General Tizzano's words:
For my part, I agree with Tetra that the Court of Justice can-
not linger over the carrying out of a purely formal linguistic
or semantic assessment in order to establish whether or not
the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in ap-
plying too rigorous ajudicial review or in claiming a standard
of proof too high for decisions prohibiting mergers. I believe
rather that the Court of Justice must look to the heart of the
matter, assessing in concrete terms whether, beyond the for-
mal aspect, the Court of First Instance did in fact carry out a
review inconsistent with the relevant provisions of Commu-
nity law and incompatible with the particular judicial role en-
trusted to it by the Treaty.10 7
There appears to be little doubt that on this point the ECJ has
done exactly as Attorney General Tizzano urges, namely that
standard of review and standard of proof form part of a general,
unified concept of "the quality of evidence." In other words, the
standard of proof and the standard of review in cases involving
complex economic assessments are so closely linked that they
can and should be discussed in the same light.
2. The Evolution of the Court's Review of the Commission's
Margin of Appreciation
The recent CFI and ECJjudgments in Tetra Laval have shed
some light on the scope of the Commission's margin of appreci-
ation in merger cases. Arguably, the issue first arose in Airtours,
the earliest of the high profile judgments annulling Commission
decisions. In Airtours, following an in-depth review of the Com-
mission's findings the CFI reached the conclusion that: "[T]he
104. Id. 41.
105. See id. 7 37, 44-45.
106. See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Tetra Laval ECJ, Case C-12/03 P,
[2004] E.C.R. 1-987, 7 68.
107. Id. 71.
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Decision, far from basing its prospective analysis on cogent evi-
dence, is vitiated by a series of errors of assessment as to factors
fundamental to any assessment of whether a collective dominant
position might be created."'108
The CFI's approach in Airtours must be read in light of the
ECJ's judgment in Tetra Laval ECJ. The CFI in that case took a
similar approach to Airtours, scrutinizing the Commission's fac-
tual claims, its analysis of them, and the conclusions it drew as to
the merger's likely competitive impact on the market and it
quashed the Commission's decision, finding it to be vitiated by
numerous errors of assessment. On appeal, the ECJ upheld the
CFI's interventionist approach:
Whilst the Court recognizes that the Commission has a mar-
gin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does
not mean that the Community Courts must refrain from re-
viewing the Commission's interpretation of information of an
economic nature. Not only must the Community Courts, in-
ter alia, establish whether the evidence relied on is factually
accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evi-
dence contains all the information which must be taken into
account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it
is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.
Such a review is all the more necessary in the case of a pro-
spective analysis required when examining a planned merger
with conglomerate effect. 109
This language is revealing in several respects. First, it can be ar-
gued that this is a statement of principle and is not limited to the
facts of the case, nor specifically to conglomerate mergers. It
can be inferred that the elements110 of judicial review listed by
the court are relevant in all competition cases, and indeed, that
is the way it should be.
Second, although the Court has recognized that the Com-
mission enjoys a margin of discretion in matters involving eco-
nomic assessments, it will conduct a detailed analysis or re-exam-
ination of the Commission's fact findings as well as the legal and
108. Airtours, Case T-342/99, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2585, 294.
109. Tetra Laval ECJ, Case C-1 2/03 P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-987, 39.
110. Namely the accuracy, reliability, consistency, probative value and complete-
ness of evidence.
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economic analysis on which the decision is based."'1 In doing
so, the Court will seek to assure themselves that the Commis-
sion's decision meets the requirements of logic, accuracy, consis-
tency and appropriateness and that it is adequately reasoned.
However, the Court in Tetra LavalECJ was careful to explain that
the CFI must not substitute its own point of view to that of the
Commission. In practice, a bright line between substitution and
the detailed review that is permissible by the CFI may prove diffi-
cult to draw.
3. The Scope of the Commission's Discretion
Today-Some Observations
Tetra Laval ECJ also raises, however, the important question
of the scope of the Commission's discretion, in particular the
matters on which the Commission is arguably sovereign. Based
on the current state of development of the Courts' case-law, we
can suggest the following as possible areas where the Commis-
sion will likely continue to enjoy a broad discretion: First, in re-
lation to market definition the Courts have generally held that
the Commission enjoys a broad margin of discretion. Conse-
quently, the Courts have tended to shy away from scrutinizing
the Commission's definition of relevant markets, provided, how-
ever, that the Commission's analysis is consistent and the evi-
dence provided in support of it is cogent. A notable example of
a case where the CFI has reviewed closely the Commission's mar-
ket definition is Schneider Electric SA v. Commission.1 12 In assessing
the compatibility of the merger in question, the Commission in
Schneider found that it would strengthen or create a dominant
position in several narrowly defined product and national mar-
kets. 1 3 However, when assessing the effects on competition the
Commission conducted its analysis at the European level describ-
ing Schneider as a "European leader," '114 thus departing from its
previous methodology of narrowly defined geographic markets.
The example serves to show that where the Commission's assess-
ment is fraught with inconsistencies (and hence lacks logic and
111. See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Tetra Laval ECJ, Case C-1 2/03 P,
[2004] E.C.R. 1-987, 39.
112. Schneider, Case T-310/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4071.
113. In terms of product market definition for example the Commission found
that there were nine different market segments for electrical parts. Id. 48.
114. Id. 148, 149.
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coherence), then the CFI will challenge the Commission's analy-
sis.
Second, the case-law of the Courts suggests that the Com-
mission is entitled to a broad margin of discretion in relation to
its choice of theory of harm applied to a case, provided, impor-
tantly, that the theory in question is consistent with, and is sup-
ported by, the underlying facts of the case. The Babyliss SA v.
Commission case,"' concerning the partial annulment of the
SEB-Moulinex merger, is a good example in this context. In this
case, the Commission used an inverse "range effects" theory to
support its finding that the merger did not raise significant con-
cerns in certain member states because "any attempt at anti-com-
petitive conduct in the dominated markets would be penalised
by smaller purchases of SEB-Moulinex products in the other
markets. "116
The CFI found that the particular theory invoked was not
supported by adequate evidence.' 1 7 In fact, the Commission ad-
mitted that it had failed to conduct a detailed economic review
of the possible implications of its unusual application of the
range effects theory.1 8 Consequently, the CFI concluded that
the Commission had misapplied the "range effects" theory as
commonly understood.1 19
The Commission also appears to have a significant margin
of appreciation as to the conduct of the administrative process,
provided that it is competent to review the merger and that it
respects the time limits set out in Article 10 of the EC Merger
Regulation, as well as the conditions for suspension of those
time limits.120 For example, in Kaysersberg SA v. Commission, the
CFI held that the Commission may suspend the relevant period
under Article EC Merger Regulation "if it considers that it is not
in possession of all the information necessary in order to adopt
115. See BaByliss SA v. Commission, Case T-114/02, [2003] E.C.R. 11-1279.
116. Id. 356.
117. Id. 1 356, 358, 363.
118. Id. 1 359.
119. Id. 356.
120. For an example of a case regarding the timing of the announcement of a
Commission decision see MCI v. Commission, Case T-310/00, [2004] 5 C.M.L.R. 26. The
Court annulled the Commission's decision, and held that the Commission lacked the
necessary competence to adopt the contested decision under the EC Merger Regula-
tion, because the parties had withdrawn their notification and had abandoned the pro-
posed merger in the form notified to the Commission.
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its decision. ' 121 Thus, assuming the Commission has all the in-
formation necessary to adopt its decision, 122 it may not suspend
the time limit purely because it feels that a party had submitted
its proposed commitments at a very late stage. 123
Equally, the Commission enjoys a margin of discretion in
determining whether, and if so, when, to accept remedies to ad-
dress substantive concerns.1 24 Nonetheless, as demonstrated in
the Tetra Laval decisions, the Courts will conduct a detailed re-
view to ensure that the Commission did not err in accepting or
rejecting the remedies offered. Furthermore, the Courts have
held that the Commission's discretion to refer cases to national
competition authorities is broad but not without boundaries.1 25
CONCLUSION
On a general level, it is clear in the wake of the Tetra Laval
judgments that the Courts' scrutiny of Commission decisions has
evolved: The in-depth consideration of the facts, and the con-
clusions the Commission draws from them, will be the subject of
intense scrutiny by the CFI and-the ECJ has now confirmed-
the CFI does not exceed its power by conducting this kind of
analysis. The choice of the term "evolution" is important, in that
it suggests that there has been no sudden or radical change in
the standard of review of the Courts. Rather, what we have wit-
nessed has been an organic process of the Courts responding to
the increased sophistication of the Commission's decisions and
of competition law in general. In this sense, one could legiti-
mately argue that it is only natural that the "requisite legal stan-
dard" is not interpreted today in the same way as it was thirty
years ago when Continental Can Co. v. Commission126 was decided.
Time will tell how this evolution will affect the Commis-
sion's own practices. Hopefully, the Commission's response will
be to further enhance the quality of its evidence in order to with-
stand the vigorous scrutiny of the CFI. If viewed in the context
121. Kaysersberg SA v. Commission, Case T-290/94, [1997] E.C.R. 11-2137, 7145.
122. An assumption which in itself is at the discretion of the Commission.
123. See Kaysersberg, Case T-290/94, [1997] ECR 11-2137, 145.
124. See Royal Philips Electronics NV v. Commission, Case T-119/02, [2003] E.C.R.
11-1433, 238.
125. See id. 77 355-66.
126. Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. Commission, Case 6/72,
[1973] E.C.R. 215.
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of the Commission's newly introduced internal checks and bal-
ances, the Tetra Lavaljudgments can also be seen as an incentive
for, or a warning to, the Commission to continue with and inten-
sify its internal reform. 1
2 7
This Article has examined some of the underlying factors
that influence the application of the standards of proof and re-
view. Ultimately, questions of proof should be addressed
pragmatically, and always in conjunction with the underlying
facts of each case.
The judgment in Tetra Laval ECJ and other recent cases ap-
pear to favor this approach. In particular, while the Courts still
couch their findings in the language of "manifest error" or "req-
uisite legal standard," the intensity of their review and the con-
comitant quality of evidence that the Commission will have to
produce varies depending on the inherent likelihood of the an-
ticompetitive effects alleged.
That these issues have been tested in difficult areas of
merger control, such as conglomerate mergers and collective
dominance, and the fact that a number of Commission decisions
have been annulled, should not come as a surprise to anyone. It
is precisely in these areas of law-where it is not readily apparent
that a concentration would have anti-competitive effects-that
the Commission must intensify its efforts to produce cogent,
well-argued and complete decisions.
We can only welcome the Courts' willingness to cast a criti-
cal eye on the Commission's merger decisions, and look to the
future for the beneficial effects of this approach for all in-
volved-the Courts, the Commission, the undertakings engaging
in merger activity, and ultimately, consumers.
127. The Commission has adopted certain internal reform measures to improve its
decision-making, most notably it has appointed a Chief Competition Economist (Pro-
fessor Lars-Hendrik R61ler) and established a "devil's advocate" panel to enhance the
internal review of its decisions and procedures. Both are steps in the right direction,
but there is ample scope for enhancing their role, as well as for rethinking some of the
proposals made in the responses to the Commission's Green Paper, which were never
implemented.
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